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concerned. The conceptual tool that is employed to that end is the “structural disaster” of 
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Introduction
The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident was extremely shocking, 
but what is even more shocking in the eyes of the present writer is the 
devastating failure in transmitting critical information about the accident to 
the people when the Japanese government faced unexpected and serious 
events after March 11, 2011. Secrecy toward outsiders has generated this 
failure; secrecy toward the people who were forced to evacuate from their 
birthplaces, toward the people who wanted to evacuate their children, toward 
the people who have been suffering from tremendous opportunity loss such 
as giving up entering college, and others. It is virtually impossible to 
enumerate all of the individual instances of suffering and aggregate them in 
an ordinarily calculable manner. Despite such expected incalculable damages, 
critical information was restricted to government insiders. This state of 
affairs seems to be similar to the state of prewar Japanese wartime 
mobilization in which all information was controlled under the name of 
supreme governmental authority.
One might consider such a comparison with the prewar state to be 
merely rhetorical. This paper argues that we can take the comparison more 
seriously as far as the patterns of behavior of the agents involved are 
concerned. It is true that the prewar Japanese military regime was oriented 
toward mobilization for war while the postwar regime has been prohibited by 
the constitution from mobilization for the purpose of war of any kind. In this 
respect, there is a large discrepancy between the prewar and postwar regimes 
as to their purpose.1 However, the surprising but telling similarity of the 
patterns of behavior of the agents in such discrepant regimes is evident if we 
look into the details of a hidden accident that took place just before the 
outbreak of World War II (abbreviated to WWII hereafter).
This paper attempts to shed fresh light on the structural causes of the 
Fukushima accident by illuminating the patterns of behavior of the agents 
involved in the little-known but serious accident involving naval vessels that 
occurred immediately before WWII, focusing particularly on the subtle 
relationship between success and failure in the complex science-technology-
society interface. Similarities and differences will then be contextualized and 
1 As far as sociological implications of “structural disaster” are concerned, there could be 
structural similarities between the two regimes as will be detailed below. For further details, see 
Matsumoto (2012a).
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their sociological implications drawn for all of us who face the post-
Fukushima situation. The conceptual tool that is employed here to that end is 
the “structural disaster” of the science-technology-society interface.
The “Structural Disaster” of the Science-Technology-Society 
Interface
The “structural disaster” of the science-technology-society interface is a 
concept developed to give a sociological account of the repeated occurrences 
of failures of a similar type (Matsumoto 2002, pp. 25-7, 2012a). In particular, 
it is developed to clarify a situation where novel and undesirable events 
happen but without a single agent to blame, to allocate responsibility for the 
events, or to prescribe remedies. The reason for denominating this failure as 
the failure of the science-technology-society interface rather than that of 
science, or of technology, or of society is worthy of attention to understand 
the development of my argument. For example, if nuclear physics is 
completely successful in understanding the process of chain reaction, 
technology such as nuclear engineering could fail in controlling the reaction 
as in the case of Chernobyl and its aftermath such as the “Cambrian sheep” 
incident (Wynne 1996).2 Or if nuclear engineering is almost completely 
successful in containing radioactive materials within reactors, social decision-
making could fail as in the case of the Three Mile Island accident (Perrow 
1984, 1999; Walker 2004). Or if society is completely successful in setting 
goals for the development of renewable energy technologies, science and/or 
technology could fail as in the case of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion 
(Matsumoto 2005).
In a word, the success or failure of science, technology, and society 
cannot be overlapped automatically (Latour 1996). In particular, there seems 
to be something missing in-between, which has unique characteristics of its 
own. The failure of interface is intended to explore this state. What are 
in-between could be institutional arrangements (Frickel and Moore 2006), 
organizational routines (Vaughan 1996; Eden 2004), and tacit interpretations 
of a formal code of ethics, invisible customs, or the networks of interests of 
different organizations. This paper focuses on, among other things, the 
structural similarity in terms of the patterns of behavior of heterogeneous 
agents that come into play in the science-technology-society interface in a 
2 For a different view on the relationships, see Collins (2011).
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specific social condition. 
If the elements of “structural disaster” can be substantiated based on 
other independent cases, then we will be in a stronger position to obtain 
pertinent sociological implications from the Fukushima accident as a 
“structural disaster” and to extend these implications to potential future 
extreme events. What follows is an independent substantiation of these 
elements by examining the almost unknown accident that happened long 
before the Fukushima accident.
The Basic Features of “Structural Disaster”
According to Matsumoto (2012a, p. 46), there are five elements that 
constitute “structural disaster.”
1.  Following wrong precedents carries over problems and reproduces 
them. 
2.  Complexity of a system under consideration and the interdependence 
of its units aggravate problems.
3. Invisible norms of informal groups virtually hollow out formal norms.
4.  Patching over problems at hand invites another patching over for 
temporary countermeasures.
5.  Secrecy develops across different sectors and blurs the locus of agents 
responsible for the problems in question.
The relevant element running through the above-mentioned prewar 
accident and the Fukushima accident is secrecy. To be accurate, the 
development of secrecy in “structural disaster” is decomposed into 
organizational errors, secrecy, and chain of secrecy to hide such errors. And 
to capture the nature of secrecy in this connection, the following fact about 
the Fukushima accident should be kept in mind in approaching the almost 
unknown accident that occurred long before the Fukushima accident: There 
have arisen repeated occurrences of similar patterns of behavior that have 
run through various different instances, which in the end have led to secrecy. 
It is true that the emergency situation during and after such an extreme 
event as the Fukushima accident can provide a good reason to expect 
confusion and delay in transmitting information. But the degree and range of 
confusion and delay went far beyond those to be expected from an 
emergency situation alone. For example, the System for Prediction of 
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Environmental Emergency Dose Information (abbreviated to SPEEDI 
hereafter) was developed with the assistance of more than ten billion yen to 
make early evacuation of affected people smoother and safer. The first 
recommendation for evacuation was made by the Japanese government on 
March 12. The prediction obtained from SPEEDI was made public for the 
first time on April 26, despite the fact that its prediction had been made 
immediately after the accident. As a result of this secrecy, residents affected 
by the accident were advised by the government to evacuate without reliable 
information at the critical initial phase when they were exposed to a high 
level dose of radiation (Matsumoto 2012a, 2012b). 
All they could do was to decide between trusting the government or not. 
SPEEDI had been awarded the first nuclear history award by the Atomic 
Energy Society of Japan in 2009 (Atomic Energy Society of Japan 2009), but 
its prediction made immediately after the Fukushima accident was never 
made public when it was needed. Organizational errors have intervened 
behind this state of affairs. This is the basic point of reference in approaching 
the almost unknown accident that happened long before the Fukushima 
accident as “structural disaster” and in securing a broader perspective for 
obtaining sociological implications from the Fukushima accident and the 
almost unknown accident that happened long before it. 
The almost unknown accident mentioned here is the accident of the 
marine turbine developed by the Imperial Japanese Navy that occurred 
immediately before the outbreak of WWII. This accident enables us to 
redefine the complex relationship between success and failure in the science-
technology-society interface both in peacetime and wartime. The accident 
was treated as top secret because of its timing. The suppression of 
information about this accident means that it has not been seriously 
considered as an event in the sociology of science and technology up to now. 
However, the description and analysis of this accident will suggest that the 
reality of the science-technology-society interface can depart significantly 
from a simplistic understanding in terms of success or failure.
Ships and Tips: The Development Trajectory of the Kanpon 
Type and Its Pitfalls
To understand the reality of this almost unknown accident, it is to the 
point to introduce two important keywords, “ships” and “tips,” as these 
keywords pinpoint the locus of the complex relationship between success and 
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failure. “Ships” here mean naval vessels of the Imperial Japanese Navy built 
until immediately before WWII. They symbolize the Navy’s success in Japan’s 
development of self-reliant technologies. “Tips” here are the broken pieces of 
naval turbine blades, which symbolize the completely unexpected failure of 
technologies. The technology taken up is the Kanpon type turbine, Kanpon 
being the Technical Headquarters of the Navy. The Kanpon type turbine was 
developed by the Imperial Japanese Navy around 1920 to substitute entirely 
self-reliant technologies for imported ones. This naval turbine provides the 
key to understanding the connection between ships and tips. The reason is 
that the Kanpon type was the standard turbine for Japanese naval vessels 
from 1920 to 1945, and behind the broken pieces of its blades laid a serious 
but little-known failure that occurred immediately before WWII. The core of 
the connection between ships and tips consists in the background against 
which the Kanpon type turbine was developed.
From the time of the first adoption of the marine turbine in the early 
twentieth century (1905) after intensive investigations and license contracts, 
the Imperial Japanese Navy accumulated experience in domestic production 
of marine turbines. Throughout this process, the Navy carefully monitored 
the quality of British, American, and various other Western type turbines and 
evaluated them.3 To replace imported turbines, the Kanpon type turbine 
achieved standardization in design, materials, and production method “that 
is independent of foreign patents” (Shibuya 1970, Vol. 1, Chap. 4, pp. 133-4). 
The Kanpon type turbine was also expected to achieve cost reduction and 
flexible usage for a wide range of purposes, which would be made possible by 
standardization.
The first Kanpon type turbine was installed in destroyers built in 1924 
(see figure 1).4
3 The British type originated in Parsons turbine and the American type in Curtis turbine, 
respectively. The first demonstration of the Parsons turbine at the Naval Review in 1897 caused a 
sensation in a complicated manner (Legett 2011). Regarding the Curtis turbine, see Somerscale 
(1992). And the license contracts with the Curtis and the Parsons types were due to expire in June 
1923 and August 1928, respectively. Considering this situation, the Navy started to take official steps 
to develop its own type. On detailed descriptions and analyses of these dual strategies of the Navy 
outlined here, see Matsumoto (2006, pp. 54-63).
4 For adetailed account of this first Kanpon type turbine, see Hakuyō Kikan Gakkai Hakuyō 
Kikan Chōsa Kenkyū Iinkai (The Research Committee of the Marine Engineering Society of Japan), 
Nippon Hakuyō Kikan Shi Jōki Tābin Hen Sōkō (An Unpublished Manuscript of the History of 
Marine Engineering in Japan: The Steam Turbine), appended tables.
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All Japanese naval vessels continued to adopt this Kanpon type turbine 
until 1945. Everyone regarded it as a landmark that showed the beginning of 
adoption of self-reliant technologies. This is because, as the Japanese 
Shipbuilding Society wrote in its official history, “there had been no serious 
trouble with the turbine blades for more than ten years since the early 1920s, 
and the Navy continued to have strong confidence in their reliability.” (The 
Japanese Shipbuilding Society 1977, p. 668)
What follows is an important counterargument to this account made up 
of unidirectional development trajectory of technologies and the 
dichotomous success or failure account of the science-technology-society 
interface by calling attention to the missing failure linking ships and tips, a 
pitfall inherent in the trajectory. The pitfall was profoundly related to an 
unbalanced secrecy within and without the military-industrial-university 
 Fig. 1.—Plane view of the first Kanpon type turbine. 
 Source: Hakuyo Kikan Gakkai Hakuyo Kikan Chosa Kenkyu Iinkai (The Research 
Committee of the Marine Engineering Society of Japan) n.d., appended plans 2.54.
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complex, the key factor leading to “structural disaster” embodied by the 
almost unknown accident. The military-industrial-university complex 
hereafter means an institutional structure made up of the governmental 
sector, particularly the military, the private industrial sector, and the 
universities—mutually autonomous in their behavior but expected together 
to contribute to national goals (Matsumoto 2006, p. 50).5
The Significant Failure Kept Secret
In December 1937, a newly built destroyer encountered an unexpected 
turbine blade breakage. Since the failure involved a standard design engine of 
the Kanpon turbine, it caused great alarm. However, it is extremely difficult 
to look into further details of this accident because there is little evidence to 
prove what is stated by official accounts (Sendō 1952; Itō 1956; War History 
Unit of the National Defense College of the Defense Agency 1969; Japanese 
Shipbuilding Society 1977; Institute for the Compilation of Historical 
5 There is no implication herewith that the complex was designed in Japan by the “rich nation, 
strong army” policy in a top-down manner. Rather, the complex in Japan had an endogenous origin. 
See Matsumoto (2006, chapter 3). As for the “rich nation, string army” policy, see Samuels (1994). 
The endogenous origin of the complex could also be detected in Britain as shown by the connection 
between physics and engineering in the life of Lord Kelvin. See Smith and Wise (1989). For a study 
on the complex with reference to American science and technology in the Cold War period, see 
Leslie (1993).
TABLE 1
References to the Little-Known Prewar Accident 
Year of Reference Author/Editor
1952 Former Engineering Rear Admiral of the Navy
1956 Mainichi newspaper reporter (Graduate of the Naval 
Academy)
1969 War History Unit of the National Defense College of 
the Defense Agency
1977 Japanese Shipbuilding Society (editor-in-chief and 
several members of the editorial committee were 
former technical officers of the Navy)
1981 Institute for the Compilation of Historical Records 
on the Navy
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Records on the Navy 1981). All the authors/editors of the official accounts 
were parties connected with the Imperial Japanese Navy (see table 1).
It appears that the accident was kept secret because it occurred during 
wartime mobilization. To confirm this, an examination of government 
documents from around the time of the accident is in order. The government 
documents consulted here are the minutes of the Imperial Diet sessions 
regarding the Navy. The minutes of the 57th Imperial Diet session (held in 
January 1930) to the 75th Imperial Diet session (held in March 1940) contain 
no less than 7,000 pages of navy-related discussions (Kanbō Rinji Chōsa Ka 
1984). These discussions include ten naval vessel incidents summarized in 
table 2. 
It is noteworthy in these discussions that the Fourth Squadron incident 
of September 1935, one of the most serious incidents in the history of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy, was made public and discussed in the Imperial Diet 
sessions within a year (on May 18, 1936).6 The accident in question occurred 
on December 29, 1937, and was handed down informally within the Navy 
and counted as a major incident on par with the Fourth Squadron incident.7
More than two years after the accident, however, there is no sign in the 
government documents indicating that it was made public and discussed in 
the Imperial Diet sessions. Reports on the accident had already been 
submitted, as will be detailed below, during the period from March to 
November 1938 (the final report was submitted on November 2). 
Nevertheless, the Imperial Diet heard nothing about the accident or any 
details of the measures taken to deal with it. The accident was so serious that 
it would have influenced the decision on whether to go to war with the U.S. 
and Britain. The Fourth Squadron incident was also serious enough to 
influence the decision after the London naval disarmament treaty was 
concluded in 1930.8 But it was made public and discussed in the Imperial 
Diet sessions. 
In this respect, there is a marked difference between the handling of the 
6 The Tomozuru incident of March 11, 1934 was the first major one for the Imperial Japanese 
Navy. Only one-and-a-half yearsafter this, a more serious incident occurred on September 26, 1935, 
which was the Fourth Squadron incident.
7 Based on interviews by the present writer with Dr. Seikan Ishigai on September 4, 1987 and June 
2, 1993, and with Dr. Yasuo Takeda on September 25, 1996 and March 19, 1997.
8 The purpose of this treaty was to restrict the total displacement of all types of auxiliary warships 
other than battleships and battle cruisers. This London treaty obliged the Imperial Japanese Navy to 
produce a new idea in hull design enabling heavy weapons to be installed within a small hull, which, 
however, proved to be achieved at the expense of the strength and stability of the hull, as the incident 
dramatically showed.
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TABLE 2
Discussions in the Imperial Diet Regarding Naval Vessel Accidents, etc.
January 1930-March 1940
Date Description 
February 13, 1931 Questions about the cause of the collision between cruisers 
Abukuma and Kitakami. (Shinya Uchida’s questions were 
answered by the Minister of the Navy, Abo, at the Lower House 
Budget Committee, the 59th Imperial Diet session)
March 2, 1931 Questions about the measures taken before and after the 
collision between cruisers Abukuma and Kitakami during large-
scale maneuvers  in 1930 and the responsibility of the 
authorities (Tanetada Tachibana’s questions were answered by 
the Minister of the Navy, Abo, at the House of Lords Budget 
Committee, the 59th Imperial Diet session)
March 17, 1933 Questions about the Minister of the Navy’s view on the 
expenditure (12,000 yen) on repairs to destroyer Usugumo and 
on the fact that the destroyer struck a well-known submerged 
rock (Shinya Uchida’s questions were answered by the Minister 
of the Navy, Ōsumi, at the Lower House Budget Committee, the 
64th Imperial Diet session)
March 2, 1935 Request for information about the results of investigation into a 
scraping incident involving four destroyers, apparently on 
training duty in Ariake Bay, reported in newspapers (Yoshitarō 
Takahashi’s questions were answered by the Minister of the 
Navy, Ōsumi, at the Lower House Budget Committee, the 67th 
Imperial Diet session)
May 18, 1936 Request for information about the seriousness of the collision 
between submarines I-53 and I-63 and the amount of money 
drawn from the reserve as a remedy (Kanjirō Fukuda’s questions 
were answered by the Accounting Bureau Director, Murakami, 
at the Lower House plenary session, the 69th Imperial Diet 
session)
May 18, 1936 Request for detailed information about the degree of damage to 
two destroyers due to violent waves in September 1935 (Kanjirō 
Fukuda’s questions were answered by the Accounting Bureau 
Director, Murakami, at the Lower House plenary session, the 
69th Imperial Diet session)
February 6, 1939 Brief explanation of the accident of submarine I-63 (The 
Minister of the Navy, Yonai, explained at the House of Lords 
plenary session, the 74th Imperial Diet session)
 “Structural Disaster” Long Before Fukushima 175
two incidents. Regarding the Fourth Squadron incident, Director of the 
Naval Accounting Bureau (Kaigun Keiri Kyoku) Harukazu Murakami was 
forced to give an answer to a question by Kanjirō Fukuda (Democratic Party) 
at the 69th Imperial Diet session held on May 18, 1936 (Kanbō Rinji Chōsa 
Ka 1984, Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 86).
Although his answer gave no information regarding the damage to 
human resources (all members of the crew confined within the bows of the 
destroyers died), it accurately stated the facts of the incident and the material 
damage incurred, which amounted to 2.8 million yen in total. Even the 
damage due to the collision between cruisers about five years earlier in table 2 
was only 180 thousand yen. The answer from a naval official clearly attested 
that the Fourth Squadron incident was so extraordinarily serious as to oblige 
him to disclose this fact to the public (Kanbō Rinji Chōsa Ka 1984, Vol. 1, 
Part 2, p. 831). It should be noted here that remedial measures for the 
problem of the turbines of all naval vessels disclosed by the accident in 
question were expected to cost 40 million yen (Shibuya n.d.).
Nevertheless, no detailed open report of the accident was presented at 
the Imperial Diet. This fact strongly indicates that the accident was top secret 
information and not allowed to go beyond the Imperial Japanese Navy. What, 
then, were the facts? This question will be answered based on documents 
owned by Ryūtarō Shibuya who was the engineering vice admiral of the Navy 
and was responsible for the turbine design of the naval vessels at the time 
Date Description 
February 7, 1939 Brief explanation of the accident of submarine I-63 (The 
Minister of the Navy, Yonai, explained at the Lower House 
plenary session, the 74th Imperial Diet session)
February 25, 1939 Request for a brief explanation of the sinking of a submarine 
due to a collision during maneuvers (Takeo Kikuchi’s questions 
were answered by the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, 
Inoue, at the House of Lords Budget Committee, the 74th 
Imperial Diet session)
February 1, 1940 Brief report on the completion of the salvage of the sunken 
submarine I-63 (Minister of the Navy, Yoshida, reported at the 
House of Lords plenary session, the 75th Imperial Diet session)
TABLE 2
(Continued)
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(these documents will be called the Shibuya archives hereafter).9
The Hidden Accident and the Outbreak of War with the U.S. 
and Britain: How Did Japan Deal with “Structural Disaster” in 
the Past?
According to the materials of the Shibuya archives, a special examination 
committee was established in January 1938 to investigate the hidden accident 
(The Minister of the Navy’s secretariat Military Secret No. 266, 1938, issued 
on January 19). It was organized as follows (Rinkicho Report, Top Secret No. 
35, 1938, Appended Sheets):
(a) General members who did not attend subcommittee meetings
Chair: Isoroku Yamamoto, Vice Admiral, Administrative Vice Minister of 
the Navy
Members: Rear Admiral Inoue, Director of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, 
Ministry of the Navy, and five other members
(b) Subcommittees
First subcommittee for dealing with engine design and planning
Members: Leader: Shipbuilding Vice Admiral Fukuma, Director of the 
Fifth Department (including the turbine group), Technical 
Headquarters of the Navy, and nine other members
Second subcommittee for dealing with maximum engine power and suitable 
load/volume
Members: Leader: Rear Admiral Mikawa, Director of the Second 
Department, Naval General Staff, and eleven other members
Third subcommittee for dealing with prior studies/experiments/systems and 
operations
9 The archives are enormous, consisting of more than 4,000 materials on subjects ranging from 
steam turbine blades to casualties of the atomic bomb (see appendix). Even though we chose only 
the materials directly related to the hidden accident in question, it is impossible to present a full 
analysis here of all the details gleaned from these voluminous materials.
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Members: Leader: Rear Admiral Iwamura, Director of the General 
Affairs Department, Technical Headquarters of the Navy, and ten other 
members
Ignoring duplication of members belonging to different subcommittees 
and arranging the net members by section, we obtained the following result 
(see table 3).  All members of the committees are insiders of a single sector, 
the military sector.
In accordance with the voluminous reports of 66 committee meetings 
held over a period of ten months, the improvement of 61 naval vessels’ 
turbines was indicated as remedial measures (Rinkicho Report, Top Secret 
No. 1, 1938 through Rinkicho Report, Top Secret No. 27, 1938).10 However, 
the blade breakage in the accident was significantly different from those that 
occurred in the past. In impulse turbines, for instance, blades in most cases 
were broken at the base where they were fixed to the turbine rotor. In 
contrast, one of the salient features of this accident was that the tip of the 
blade was broken off. The broken off part amounted to one third of the total 
length of the blade. Figure 2 is a photograph showing the locus of the 
breakage (Rinkicho Report, Top Secret No. 1, 1938).
TABLE 3
Members of the Special Examination Committee by Section11
Section Number
Administrative Vice Minister of the Navy
Bureau of Naval Affairs
Naval General Staff
Technical Headquarters of the Navy
Naval Staff College








10 When we classify previous turbine failures during the period from 1918 to October 1944 by 
location, failures involving turbine blades account for 60 percent of the total (Seisan Gijutsu Kyōkai 
1954, pp. 1-2). The Imperial Japanese Navy had thus had many problems with turbine blades for 
many years and accumulated experience in handling them. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the 
special examination committee took the failure as a mere routine problem from the outset based on 
such a long and copious experience.
11 Calculated based on the Rinkicho Report, Top Secret No. 35, 1938, Appended Sheets.
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Turning our attention to wartime mobilization of the day, the Japanese 
government enacted the Wartime Mobilization Law on April 1, 1938 for the 
purpose of “controlling and organizing human and material resources most 
efficiently......in case of war” (Clause 1). Naval vessels came first in the 
specification of the law as “resources for wholesale mobilization” (clause 2).12 
Against this background, the naval engine failure caused by small tip 
fragments of the main standard engine was a very delicate matter for anyone 
to raise. And yet, for the reason mentioned above, the cause of this failure 
seemed to be significantly different from any previous routine problems. The 
complete test for detecting the cause of this peculiar accident required the 
12 Ishikawa (1982, p. 412). The author was in charge of drafting the national mobilization plan at 
the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku In) in the prewar period.
 Fig. 2.—Broken part of a blade in the turbine failures.
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Navy to construct from scratch a full-scale experimental apparatus designed 
for the load test of the standard Kanpon turbine, which was only completed 
in December 1941, the month the war with the U.S. and Britain broke out. 
As a result, the schedule for identifying the cause, which was originally 
expected to be completed in November 1940, was extended to mid-1943 
(Kaigun Kansei Honbu Dai 5 Bu 1943). Thus, it is probable that all of Japan’s 
naval vessels had turbines which were imperfect for some unknown reason 
when the country went to war with the U.S. and Britain in 1941.
What was the true cause?13 The true cause was binodal vibration. 
Previous efforts to avoid turbine vibration had been confined to one-node 
vibration at full speed since multiple-node vibration below full speed had 
been assumed to be hardly serious and unworthy of attention based on rule 
of thumb (Sezawa 1932; Pigott 1937, 1940). The final discovery of the true 
cause of the hidden accident drastically changed the situation. It revealed that 
marine turbines were susceptible to a serious vibration problem below full 
speed. It was in April 1943 that this true cause was eventually identified by 
the final report of the special examination committee—almost one and a half 
years after war broke out (Kaigun Kansei Honbu Dai 5 Bu 1943; see figure 3).
Strictly in terms of the technology involved in the accident without 
hindsight, therefore, the evidence suggests that the Japanese government 
went to war in haste in 1941, notwithstanding the fact that it had highly 
intricate and serious problems with the main engines of all its naval vessels. 
And that fact was kept secret by the military sector from other sectors in the 
military-industrial-university complex, not to speak of the general public. 
The rarity of breakdowns of naval vessels due to turbine troubles during the 
war is a completely different matter, a kind of hindsight. Thus, the hidden 
accident strongly suggests that practical results alone (for example, rarity of 
breakdowns of naval vessels due to turbine troubles) during wartime, possibly 
in peacetime as well, do not prove the essential soundness of the development 
trajectory of technology, and that of national decision-making along the 
trajectory. 
13 For the detailed disentanglement of heterogeneous socio-technical factors which led to the 
detection of the true cause, see Matsumoto (2006, Chapter 6).
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 Fig. 3.—The front page of the final report of the special examination committee.
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The Sociological Implications for the Fukushima Accident: 
Beyond Success or Failure 
The above description and analysis of an independent case, a hidden 
accident that happened long before the Fukushima accident, provides an 
important guideline for understanding the Fukushima accident as a 
“structural disaster” beyond the simplistic dichotomy of success or failure. 
For one thing, critical information on significant failures in an emergency 
situation was made secret to outsiders of the governmental sector in both the 
prewar accident and the Fukushima accident. Secondly, both accidents 
occurred after a long history of successful technological development: The 
prewar hidden accident that happened long after a successful operation of the 
naval turbine in question, Kanpon type, since the 1920s reminds us of its 
structural similarity to the Fukushima accident that happened after a long 
successful operation of nuclear reactors closely associated with the myth of 
safety.14
Most importantly, the sociological implications of this prewar hidden 
accident pertain to the social context of organizational errors. The social 
context of the prewar accident is the wartime mobilization of science and 
technology, which was authorized by the Wartime Mobilization Law of 1938 
and the Research Mobilization Ordinance of 1939. This formal legal 
foundation gave rise to the structural integration of the military-industrial-
university complex under the control of the military sector. The military 
sector controlled the overall mobilization, in which the industrial sector and 
the universities had to obey orders given by the military. This was also 
associated with an extremely secretive attitude of the military toward 
outsiders. According to Hidetsugu Yagi who invented a crucial component 
technology of radars in the form of the pioneering Yagi antenna and in 1944 
became the president of the Board of Technology, the central governmental 
authority specially set up for the wartime mobilization of science and 
technology, the military “treated civilian scientists as if they were foreigners” 
14 As to the little-known prewar accident, the recognition of binodal turbine blade vibration as the 
true cause was beyond the knowledge of most turbine designers of the day. This type of problem is 
supposed to have been unrecognized until the postwar period. In the postwar period, avoiding 
turbine blade vibration caused by various resonances still provided one of the most critical topics for 
research on turbine design (Trumpler Jr. and Owens 1955; Andrews and Duncan 1956; Visser 1960). 
In fact, a similar failure occurred even in 1969 in the QE2’s turbine (Report on QE2 turbines 1969).
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(Report on Scientific Intelligence Survey in Japan 1945).15
Thus, cooperation, not to speak of coordination, with the military sector 
was very limited even among the central governmental authorities specially 
set up to integrate every effort for the wartime mobilization of science and 
technology, and the military-industrial-university complex began to lose its 
overall integration. What is important here is the fact that this functional 
disintegration of the network of relationships linking the military and the 
other sectors was taking place just at the time the strong structural 
integration of the complex was formally being reinforced by the Wartime 
Mobilization Law of 1938 and the Research Mobilization Ordinance in the 
next year.
This coexistence of structural integration and functional disintegration 
during wartime mobilization provides a suitable background for redefining 
success or failure not only in prewar Japan’s context but in the current context 
of the Fukushima accident. If the Fukushima accident is “structural disaster,” 
it could have some characteristics similar to the coexistence of structural 
integration and functional disintegration. For example, functional 
disintegration of the network of relationships linking the government, 
TEPCO officials, and the reactor designers of heavy electric equipment 
manufacturers might be taking place just at a time when the strong structural 
integration of the government-industrial-university complex was formally 
reinforced by the seemingly well-organized ordinances and laws revolving 
around the “double-check” system within a single ministry in the past and 
that between two ministries now, between METI (Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry) and the Ministry of the Environment, ministry-bounded 
in either case.
As long as this kind of functional disintegration of the science-
technology-society interface continues to exist and to operate behind the 
façade of structural integration, this state of affairs can lead to similar serious 
failures in quite a different and larger-scale social context. The possibility of 
functional disintegration through structural integration coupled with secrecy 
and the suppression of negative information under the name of 
communication activities in the current context could be one of the 
important symptoms of “structural disaster” embodied by the Fukushima 
accident. 
For example, while various communication activities to facilitate links 
15 These are Yagi’s words on September 11, 1945, when interrogated by General Headquarters of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, Pacific Scientific and Technical Advisory Section.
 “Structural Disaster” Long Before Fukushima 183
between science, technology, and society had been carried out with public 
funds as represented in Café Scientifique before the Fukushima accident, it 
turns out that there had been only one Café Scientifique on anything nuclear 
(held on July 24, 2010) out of 253 carried out in the Tohoku district including 
Fukushima prefecture. And yet the topic taken up then had nothing to do 
with any kind of risk from nuclear power plants, not to speak of extreme 
events.16 This implies various activities that are supposed to facilitate well-
balanced links between science, technology, and society in reality did nothing 
in advance about the communication of the negative aspect of nuclear power 
plants and, therefore, played no role in early warning against extreme events 
such as the Fukushima accident.
If the “structural disaster” thus embedded in the social context of the 
Fukushima accident continues to exist in a path-dependent manner, the 
science-technology-society interface surrounding the Fukushima accident 
would probably be unable to tolerate another impact that could be given by 
serious and unexpected events such as a second huge earthquake and 
tsunami and/or the difficulty of decontamination within some of the reactors 
in question and their abrupt uncontrollability.17
Therefore the most important lesson to learn from the Fukushima 
accident as “structural disaster” in light of the hidden one that happened 
much earlier immediately before the outbreak of WWII is how to avoid the 
worst of this kind. That is to say, the seemingly structurally robust but 
functionally disintegrated science-technology-society interface due to secrecy 
should be changed. It should be changed by the will of the people who are 
suffering from the Fukushima accident and a significant structural remedy 
should be instituted beyond countermeasures that only temporarily patch 
over individual troubles coming to light at that moment.
Conclusion: Prospects for the Future
From the viewpoint of “structural disaster,” there are two different kinds 
of similarities between the prewar hidden accident and the Fukushima 
accident: one relating to the timing of secrecy, the other to the social context 
16 What is mentioned here is confirmed on November 18 through the following portal website on 
Café Scientifique in Japan. http://cafesci-portal.seesaa.net/
17 Although the question of high-level radioactive waste disposal has not been discussed in Japan 
in association with the Fukushima accident up to now, the disposal question should be added to the 
list of “serious and unexpected events” (Matsumoto 2010; Macfarlane 2012).
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of organizational errors. 
First, regarding the timing of secrecy in relation to technological 
trajectory, both accidents took place after dozens of years of successful 
operation of domestically produced technologies. This situation made it 
extremely difficult for the agents involved in the two accidents to make the 
accidents public even at a critical moment of decision-making because 
disclosing the accidents should have drastically destroyed the trust of the 
agents in the public sphere. In that particular sense, secrecy in both accidents 
could be the result of the need for face-saving of the agents who went 
through “self-reliant failure” for the first time.
Second, there is a similarity between the two accidents in terms of the 
social context of organizational errors. That is to say, the coexistence of 
structural integration and functional disintegration observed in the prewar 
accident could similarly reside in the Fukushima accident, together with 
asymmetrical relationships between the governmental sector and other 
sectors. In this connection, nuclear-industrial-university complex in the 
current context could be a “dysfunctional” equivalent to military-industrial-
university complex in the prewar period.
Of course, there are differences between the two accidents. Among other 
things, the difference in the way organizational errors came to be detected 
and corrected is noteworthy. In the prewar accident, the conclusion once 
reached based on the voluminous reports of the special examination 
committee and yet authorized by the organization in question was 
dynamically changed by carefully observed facts of the locus of sheered tip 
regardless of past experience accumulated in the organization. Such a 
dynamic reconsideration of alternative possibilities that must have upset the 
face-saving procedure within a specific organization triggered the restart of 
the examination leading to a drastically different conclusion. 
In contrast, there has been no sign up until now of the working of this 
kind of dynamic correction of organizational errors in the Fukushima 
accident. Looking at inside stories of TEPCO, former NISA, newly set up 
NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority), and other governmental bodies that 
have been disclosed one after another, one might rather well suspect the 
working of mutual “cover-ups” within and/or between those organizations in 
question, though the possibility of the dynamic correction of organizational 
errors might still be left open. 
This difference is noteworthy because, even with the working of such a 
dynamic correction of organizational errors and reconsideration of 
alternative possibilities, the timing of the realization of the true cause of the 
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prewar accident was too late for Japan to check the soundness of national 
decision-making before going to war in 1941. 
In sum, putting together the similarity between the prewar accident and 
the Fukushima accident as “structural disaster” and the difference as to 
whether the dynamic correction of organizational errors and the 
reconsideration of alternative possibilities work, it is crucial for us in the 
current context to be fully aware of the risk of being too late in two senses. 
First, we should not be too late in bringing the minimum essentials of the still 
ongoing accident to the public sphere through breaking secrecy and the chain 
of secrecy. Secondly, we should not be too late in correcting organizational 
errors because of the face-saving of the organizations in question. These two 
points are crucial for the Fukushima accident as “structural disaster,” because 
delayed timing could mean the start of something devastating, 
uncontrollable, and irreversible to all of us. 
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Appendix
Materials of the Shibuya Archives
Item Number of Materials
  Marine Engineering
     Steam Turbines (Blades, Rotors) 85
     Steam Turbines (Domestic) 237
     Steam Turbines (Foreign) 133
     Reduction Gearing 108
     Condensers 48
     Propellers/Propulsion Shafting 145
     Boilers (General) 228
     Boilers (Velox Boiler) 19
     Boilers (Feed Water) 56
     Boilers (Automatic Control) 22
     Auxiliaries (General) 151
     Auxiliaries (Steering Gear, etc.) 50
     Auxiliaries (Distilling Plant) 34
     Piping 152
     Internal Combustion Engines 392
     Gas Turbines 91
     Rinkicho Failures 45
     Materials 206
     Fuel/Lubricant 47
     Submarines 53
     Compendium & Design of Marine Engines 149
     Trial Reports 80
     Vibration/Noise 34
     Bearing 32
     General Reports/Bye-laws 62
     Miscellaneous 104
  Naval Architecture
     Technical Reports 49
     Design 47
     Hull Structure 125
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Item Number of Materials
     Materials/Hull Corrosion 79
     Welding 58
     Tanker/Bulk Carriers 57
     Fishing Vessels                           21
     Miscellaneous                             80
  Nuclear Power 170
  Weapons/Weapons Systems
     Guns 7
     Gunpowder 17
     Materials 72
     Torpedoes 7
     Ship Electrical Systems22
     Navigation Systems 5
     Warplanes 55
  Miscellaneous
Including manuscripts, memoranda, 585
Photographs, etc.
  Total 4,219
 Source: Based on Shibuya Bunko Chosa Iinkai, Shibuya Bunko Mokuroku (Catalogue of 
the Shibuya archives), March 1995.
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